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DEPORTATION AS A COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCE OF A GUILTY PLEA: WHY
THE FEDERAL PRECEDENT SHOULD BE
REEVALUATED
INTRODUCTION

Section 1251 of the Immigration and Nationality Act currently mandates the
deportation of aliens convicted of violating any law or regulation relating to
narcotics or moral turpitude offenses.2 The language of section 1251(a) is

1. United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990), was selected to exemplify the
typical hardship encountered by aliens in deportation scenarios resulting from 8 U.S.C. § 1251. In
1987, Sabino Del Rosario pleaded guilty upon advice of counsel to one count of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. He is a resident of the Dominican Republic and was living in the
District of Columbia at that time. During his sentencing hearing, Rosario's court appointed attorney
and the prosecutor discussed the possibility of deportation as a result of the alien's guilty plea, but
the defendant was never advised of any such consequences. As a result, Del Rosario served a ten
month jail sentence. He did not become aware of his immigration problems until the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) moved to deport him. Immediately upon discovering the intentions
of the INS, Del Rosario filed a Pro Se Motion for Court Appointed Counsel to Withdraw Guilty Plea
and to Vacate Sentence, but evidently his efforts were futile. The District Court rejected the motion
after reviewing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 56. Subsequently, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia found insufficient "miscarriage of justice" to overturn the
District Court's holding, and no relief was given. Id.
In Del Rosarioand many other cases, aliens facing drug charges have pleaded guilty based on
the advice of their attorneys as to the consequences. Frequently, such defendants are indigents who
are uneducated and represented by court appointed counsel. The degree of unfairness in each
situation varies, but irrespective of these recurring inequitable scenarios, perhaps the most
troublesome aspect of the federal court precedent in this area is that aliens are given two sentences:
a jail term assessed by the court and then a life sentence in exile imposed by the INS.
2. The pertinent language of 8 U.S.C. § 1251 is as follows:
(a) Any alien (inlcuding an alien crewman) in the United States shall, upon the order of
the Attorney General, be deported if the alien is deportable as being within one or more
of the following classes of aliens:
(2)(A)(i) Any alien who (I) [ils
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five
years after the date of entry, and
(11) either is sentenced to confinement or is confined therefore in a prison or
correctional institution for one year or longer, is deportable.
(it)
Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless
of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.
(ii) Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after entry is
deportable.
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mandatory; once the Attorney General orders the deportation proceeding to be

commenced, the presiding judge must order the alien deported if the evidence
supports a finding of a violation under this section.' The Immigration and
Nationality Act applies to any person who is not a citizen or national of the
4
United States, including people lawfully residing in this country.

What Congress has failed to realize and many federal courts blatantly
ignore is that legal resident aliens, who are often unfamiliar with their rights in
the United States, rely on their lawyers, who are their advocates and experts in
the law, to insure the aliens' resident status in such situations. Thus, aliens
frequently plead guilty to lesser offenses upon advice of counsel without being
properly informed of the potential drastic immigration ramifications! Aliens

plead guilty believing that the sentence imposed by the court is the full
punishment that will be imposed by the government of the United States.6
Subsequently, such defendants must ask the courts to withdraw guilty pleas and

(B)(i) Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or
a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of of the
Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), other than a single offense involving
possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
(i) Any alien who is, or at any time after entry has been, a drug abuser or addict is
deportable.
Although section 1251 references a number of other reasons for deporting aliens, this Note
concentrates on subsection (a)(2)(B) because this subsection vividly illustrates the inequity that aliens
are forced to endure under the collateral consequence doctrine.
The term "deportation", when used in this Note and the referenced materials, is defined as
"the removal or return of an alien to the country from which he or she has come because the alien's
presence has been deemed by the United States, to be inconsistent with the public welfare." Mark
E. Roseman, The Alien and the Guilty Plea: Caveat to the Defense, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV. 155, 163
(1984).
3. Guan Chow Tok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 538 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1976),
articulates this idea very concisely. The court in Guan Chow Tok stated, "while we may be
concerned at the hardship it imposes on the minor offender, we must nevertheless follow its
strictures. The same also applies to the immigration judge who cannot exercise discretion and
withhold deportation in contravention of the statute [8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11)1."
4. See Roseman, supra note 2, at 155 n.5, stating, '[t]he United States Constitution does not
distinguish between rights afforded to citizens or aliens. Likewise, there is no distinction made
between citizens and aliens in the Bill of Rights."
5. See generally Edward Bendik & Patricia Cardoso, Immigration Law Consequencesfor the
Criminal Defense Attorney, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 33 (1989). 'Many [actions] are being brought by
aliens legally in this country who have pleaded guilty to criminal charges on advice of counsel and
have thereby subjected themselves to possible serious immigration consequences." Id. at 34.
6. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "They [aliens] are deported
by the same branch of government that brings criminal charges against them . . . ." Id. Thus,
when the aliens plead guilty to certain crimes for a specified sentence, they logically assume that the
government imposed sentences represent the complete penalty.
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vacate judgments to retain their right to remain in this country.'

In combating the unfair conditions under which guilty pleas are sustained,
aliens have directed the courts' attention to two constitutional guarantees. First,
alien defendants have argued that defense attorneys' erroneous advice and/or
lack of advice regarding deportation consequences constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment Second, aliens
have challenged the validity of their guilty pleas [asserting that the pleas were
neither knowingly nor voluntarily obtained, thus infringing on Due Process
guarantees]. 9 Similarly, in challenging the voluntariness and intelligence of
7. There are a number of manners in which the process occurs. The Supreme Court held that
a violation of Due Process or other constitutional guarantees could render a guilty plea invalid.
Violation of a constitutional guarantee is the most obvious way to invalidate a prior guilty plea.
United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1973).
However, Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also requires that a judgment
be vacated in certain circumstances, United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1954).
Rule 32(d) provides for the withdrawal of pleas both before and after sentencing, and the practice
is liberal. Russell, 686 F.2d at 37. Yet, withdrawal is never a matter of right and is allowed after
sentencing only to correct manifest injustice. Id.
In addition, the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require the
court to scrutinize the intelligence and voluntariness of the plea before acceptance. The requirements
of Rule 11 are separate and distinct from those of Rule 32(d). If Rule 11 requirements are not met,
a previously entered guilty plea may also be vacated under Rule 11. See infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
Finally, post conviction relief is available to persons in custody under sentence of a court by
virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 through a habeas corpus petition, and by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1651
after the sentence has expired. United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Mich.
1987). Under the latter section, relief may be granted only if a Constitutional right is at stake. Id.
8. The text of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to

have the Assistance of Counselfor his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). See also infra note 20.
9. This Due Process argument is based on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969),
which mandates that any simultaneous waiver of multiple constitutional rights such as the rights to
avoid self-incrimination and to a trial by jury requires a knowing and voluntary relinquishment by
the defendant. Under this analysis, the defendant must possess an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts in order to waive his rights voluntarily. Id.
The Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution to embody this right to make only knowing and voluntary waivers. Id. The applicable
portions of text from these respective Amendments read: "No person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No State shall
.. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
" U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Supreme Court further expanded on the due process issue in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985). In Hill, the Court held that neither the Constitution nor Rule 11 ofthe Federal Rules of
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their pleas, aliens have alleged violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.'" The constitutional dimensions of such scenarios are
apparent," and aliens subjected to the current federal court precedent
desperately need the attention of the United States Supreme Court to insure the
protection of their constitutional rights.'
This Note will begin by examining the contexts of these two types of
constitutional claims for relief. Next, the reasons for the federal court precedent
and its harshness in this area will be demonstrated. In discussing the federal
court precedent, this Note will define the parameters of the collateral
consequence test that generally determine the outcome in actions alleging
ineffective representation or involuntary pleas.' 3 This Note will illustrate how

Criminal Procedure required that the states give the defendant information about the collateral
consequence of parole eligibility in order for the plea to be voluntary. Id. at 56. The Sixth Circuit
has held that if the procedures mandated by Congress do not provide an alien with Due Process
protection during the deportation process, the procedures must yield Aguilera Enriquez v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 517 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976). Id. at 568. The Sixth Circuit's holding in Enriquez is in accordance with the United State's
Supreme Court case of Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), which established that aliens are
entitled to Due Process protection. Id. at 100. See also James Marx, Comment, Legalization Under
the Immigration Reform and ControlAct of 1986; Scope of Confidentiality Provisionsand Problems
in Proving Residence, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1077, 1102 (1987).
By contrast, the Second Circuit has held that the lack of knowledge regarding deportation
resulting in a guilty plea does not violate Due Process. United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787,
789 (2d Cir. 1973).
10. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also supra note 7 and infra
note 54 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 20 and 46.
12. In United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990), Judge Mikva concurred
explaining the necessity of a revision to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criinal Procedure. Judge
Mikva's views focused on insuring aliens the right to be informed of possible deportation resulting
from a guilty plea. Id.
This Note concentrates on securing precisely these rights. Yet, in addition to the protections
afforded to defendants through court rules suggested by Judge Mikva, this Note contends that the
right to be fully informed of all "material and substantial" consequences raises constitutional
questions, in requiring a change in the present consequence advisement test: the collateral
consequence doctrine.
13. The doctrine of collateral consequences was created by the United States Supreme Court
in Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). In Carafas, the Court applied the doctrine to find lack
of mootness in a case where a habeas corpus petitioner had been released from prison, but still
desired to pursue his habeas corpus action. Id. at 237. The Court described the situation as follows:
[IDn consequence of his [the petitioner's] conviction, he cannot engage in certain
businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time;
he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror.
Because of these "disabilities or burdens which may flow from" petitioner's conviction,
he has a "substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction
of the sentence imposed on him." Id.
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federal courts determine which consequences of guilty pleas are collateral and
not an automatic result of the plea and which consequences are direct. 4 Then,

the inappropriateness of the current federal doctrine that makes such a distinction
between consequences will be shown where aliens are subjected to a life
sentence in exile as a result.'"
Finally, this Note will explore the alternatives to using the collateral
consequence test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims and claims of
involuntary and unintelligent pleas by aliens whose lawyers failed to properly
advise them of the possibility of deportation. The possible alternatives range
from maintaining the collateral/direct dichotomy and merely creating a tangent
to the test for extremely material and substantial consequences, to abandoning
the current test altogether for a materiality based standard. This Note concludes
by reiterating the constitutional magnitude of the rights to effective assistance of
counsel and voluntary and intelligent pleas, and argues that a corollary to the
present federal consequence test is required to insure these constitutional rights.
Only by making aliens aware of the possible deportation consequences of a
guilty plea can justice be served.
II. THE STRUCTURE

OF TYPICAL CONSTrMUTIONAL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF IN
VACATING ALIEN DEFENDANTS' GUILTY PLEAS

When an alien is charged with a narcotics-related offense, aliens, like most
people, generally seek advice of counsel to discover their alternatives under the
laws of the United States and any other applicable jurisdiction. 6 Frequently,
these defendants enter guilty pleas after consulting with their attorneys.' 7 To

14. See infra notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 80 and accompanying text where the court used this language to describe
deportation.
16. An article in Volume 79 of the Illinois Bar Journal offers a hypothetical factual scenario
of the typical developments in a drug case involving an alien. Mary L. Sfasciotti, Representing
Aliens in Criminal Cases - Recent Amendments to the Immigration and NaturalizationAct, 79 ILL.
B.I. 78, 78 (1991). In this factual depiction, the alien is a first time offender who has been in the
United States for four years and is married to an American citizen. Id. The alien pleads guilty to
a reduced charge and a lesser sentence upon advice of counsel who was unaware of the immigration
ramifications. Id. Consequently, when the alien discovers the INS has lodged a detainer against
him with the prison authorities where he is serving his sentence, the alien seeks to vacate his
conviction. Id.
Mary Sfasciotti analyzes the hypothetical situation under both the federal Immigration and
Nationality Act and Illinois state law. For purposes of this Note, the scenario offers a vivid
illustration of developments in a case involving an alien charged with a narcotics offense. The
outcome of the alien's plight under Illinois law has little relevance here.
17. Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guily Pleas In the Federal
Criminal Justice Sstem, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 157 (1981) citing E.R. Shipp, Criminal
Court Seeks Relief on Worsening Caseload, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1981, at Al, to demonstrate the
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their dismay, by pleading guilty, these aliens expose themselves to deportation
consequences under the Immigration and Nationality Act through the Attorney
General's office. s Due to the surprising effect of the plea on the duration of
these individuals' lives, many alien defendants have raised constitutional
challenges to the validity of their guilty pleas. 9
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The typical constitutional challenges that aliens wield in attacking their
previous pleas of guilty are grounded in the Sixth Amendment.'
The Sixth
Amendment entitles all criminal defendants to a trial and to be represented at
that trial by counsel.2 The federal courts have generally extended such rights
to aliens.' In order to give the right to counsel significance, the United States

Supreme Court has interpreted these Sixth Amendment guarantees to include the
right to "effective" assistance of counsel.2?

In McMann v. Richardson, the

Court emphasized that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is
to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent
counsel.74
To ascertain when counsel's performance rises to a level on incompetence
such that it violates the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, the
Court devised a two-pronged standard in Strickland v. Washington.' The
defendant initially must demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.'
requirement,

aliens

have

based

their

In attempting to satisfy this first
claims

on

both

affirmative

point that most criminal defendants enter guilty pleas after plea bargaining with the prosecution.
Using the New York courts as an example, Shipp reports, "[t]o keep their calendars manageable,
judges try to dispose of as many cases as possible each week. The most common method of
accomplishing this is plea bargaining." Id. Because defendants with counsel always enter plea
bargains through their counsel, or at least become aware of such deals by way of counsel, the
defense attorney must necessarily convey some information to the defendant about the plea.
18. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 20 and 46 and accompanying text.
20. "[I]n the last four years, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of motions to
vacate judgments based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel [Sixth Amendment]. Many
are being brought by aliens who have pleaded guilty to criminal charges on advice of counsel and
have, thereby, subjected themselves to possible serious immigration ramifications." Edward Bendik
& Patricia Cardoso, ImmigrationLaw Considerations for the Criminal Defense Attorney, 61 N.Y.
ST. BJ. 33 (1989).
21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989). But see Lavoie v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1969).
23. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
24. Id. at 760.
25. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
26. Id. at 687.
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misrepresentations by their attorneys concerning deportation consequences' and
the passive conduct of their attorneys in failing to give advice regarding the
likelihood of deportation.' In order to fulfill the first part of this standard the
defendant alien must show that his or her lawyer acted unprofessionally.?
Aliens have had minimal success in vacating guilty pleas with these
arguments, but absent any particularizing facts in a given case, the federal courts
generally provide relief with less reluctance where the lawyer gave erroneous
advice to the defendant.' Even in situations where the attorney has clearly
given the alien incorrect information pertaining to deportation, relief has been
denied. 3 In general, reaction of the federal courts to motions by aliens to
withdraw guilty pleas or vacate judgments has been mixed and often
contradictory in response.32
In addition, the Supreme Court has implemented a heavy presumption that
defense counsel's performance was reasonable.33 Not only must the first prong
of the Strickland test be met, but the alien defendant carries an "extra"-heavy

27. This is an instance where the attorney actually tells the defendant something or gives the
defendant inaccurate information on which the defendant relies. United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d
1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. United States v. Quin, 836 F.2d 654, 655 (Ist Cir. 1988).
29. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
30. United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1975).
31. "Even where an affirmative misrepresentation has been made and the defendant has a
colorable claim of innocence, the counsel may not have been constitutionally ineffective." DownsMorgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540-41 (1 1th Cir. 1985). As a result, a guilty plea need
not be vacated despite erroneous statements by counsel to a defendant.
32. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Misrepresentation, or
Failure to Advise, of Immigration Consequences of Guilty Plea -Federal Cases, 90 A.L.R. FED.
748 (1990 & Supp. 1991). The annotation illustrates that in cases where aliens attempted to
withdraw their guilty pleas because they were unaware of the deportation consequences, the courts
have reached differing results on whether, under particular circumstances involved, a convicted alien
defendant was denied effective assistance by defense counsel's misrepresentation or
nonrepresentation of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Thus, in some federal decisions
the courts have remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether defense counsel's alleged
misrepresentation of such consequences constituted inadequate representation. However, in other
federal cases, the courts have rejected a contention or apparent contention that defense counsel's
misrepresentation of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea amounted to incompetent
representation. id. at 749. In Downs-Morgan, the court described the appellant's arguments and
summarized the applicable case law in the same manner as accomplished above. Downs-Morgan,
765 F.2d at 1537. "Both parties rely on cases involving counsel's failure to inform the accused of
the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The courts that consider whether such an omission
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel are divided on the issue." Id.
33. The Supreme Court has held that the defense counsel's actions are presumed to be
professional, and when seeking relief, defendants carry a heavy burden in proving that the attorney
acted unreasonably, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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burden of proof in such cases.' Consequently, the alien faces a serious battle
in seeking to retract a prior guilty plea.
The District Court in Janvier v. United States employed perhaps the most
impartial measurement of attorneys' conduct to date when it held that a failure
to investigate the applicable law of a case cannot be considered adequate under
prevailing norms of professional competency." This appears to be a specific
method that can be used to determine the effectiveness of an attorney's
representation. Under this test, courts would seemingly vacate all guilty pleas
where the defense attorney has not researched, discovered, and informed the
defendant about deportation consequences.
In Janvier, the court relied on the rationale of Strickland in scrutinizing
whether the defense attorney's decisions were made after a thorough
investigation of the law and facts.'
To this author, a lawyer is acting
unreasonably when he fails to investigate the citizenship of his client, regardless
of the factual setting of the case. Clearly, an attorney acts unprofessionally
when he fails to research and discuss with his client the law of a guilty plea in
relation to a basic fact of the case, his client's citizenship.
The second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel
requires the defendant to establish that but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the results of the proceeding would have been different. 7 Hill v. Lockhart'
applied the Strickland test directly to an ineffective assistance claim arising out
of the plea process. In Hill, the Court found that the second prong of the
analysis would be satisfied by showing that but for counsel's errors, he [the
alien] would not have plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
test.'

After Hill, aliens could easily satisfy the second prong of the Strickland
An alien can comply with the second prong by offering a specific

34. Id. See also Montgomery v. Peterson, 846 F.2d 407, 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (supporting the
same proposition).
35. Although the court in Janvier was dealing with the failure of an alien's defense counsel to
seek a recommendation against deportation from the court, the criteria used to judge the adequacy
of counsel's behavior is extremely applicable. Janvier v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 827
(N.D.N.Y. 1987).
36. Id. at 829.
37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
38. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
39. Id. at 59.
40. Although Hill was decided on the ground that the second prong of Strickland (prejudice)
was lacking, the method of scrutinizing for prejudice in Hill provided trial courts with a lower
threshold for finding the second prong to be satisfied. The second prong could be considered first
in order to dispose of a case, but a reasonable claim that the defendant would have otherwise sought
a trial satisfies the prejudice prong. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53.
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explanation of why he would have plead not guilty and gone to trial.4'
However, some courts require a colorable claim of innocence to meet this
inquiry. 2 Thus, alien defendants who have walked into this funhouse of
surprises generally do not have problems showing prejudice caused by counsel's
lack of precision. Rather, more of the court hesitation in sustaining ineffective
assistance claims arises from an unwillingness to find the actions of lawyers to
be unprofessional.43
An even greater obstacle to relief in such actions is that most courts dealing
with ineffective assistance claims tend to apply the collateral consequence
doctrine; where counsel's representation was allegedly inadequate, the
voluntariness of the plea becomes an issue." The problems encountered
because of involuntariness in the plea are discussed in detail in the next section
of this Note.
Still, ineffective assistance claims arguably remain viable because of the
inconsistent results in the lower federal courts that have heard such challenges
by aliens.4
Consequently, the difficulty of persuading federal courts that
counsel acted unprofessionally in such situations suggests that a change in the
system that governs such actions is desperately needed.
B. The Intelligence anzd Voluntariness of the Plea
In numerous ineffective assistance challenges raised by aliens against the
validity of their guilty pleas, an intimately related argument has also been
presented. In addition to the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim,
most defendants argue that their pleas were not entered voluntarily and
intelligently.'
To avoid violating current federal standards of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process, courts must insure that defendants fully understand
41. Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 138 (7th Cir. 1986).
42. United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
43. See United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989) (outlining a typical rejection of
a Sixth Amendment challenge to a guilty plea due to a lack of effective assistance of counsel). The
last few sentences of the opinion, citing Strickland,state this proposition clearly: "[clonsequently,
we decline to hold as a matter of law that counsel's failure to inform a client as to the immigration
consequences which may result from a guilty plea, without more, is 'outside the wide range of
professional competent assistance'." Id. at 338. See also supra note 31.
44. See infra notes 46-48.
45. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
46. United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Russell, 686
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Alvarez-Quiroga, 901 F.2d 1433, 1434 (7th Cir. 1990).
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the consequences of their pleas.47 Even where the defendant has not argued
that the plea was involuntary, if counsel was alleged to be ineffective, courts
will often decide the voluntariness issue.'
The interrelation of the ineffective assistance claims and the involuntary
plea claims is exemplified by Hill v. Lockhard.49 In claiming that counsel
rendered insufficient assistance, aliens are almost automatically, though
indirectly, arguing that they could not have entered guilty pleas voluntarily and
intelligently.' This interrelation of challenges should not detract from the fact
that aliens' rights are affected in more than one respect.
Hill may also suggest that the Supreme Court agrees with the lower federal
courts because it has rejected any notion of court duty to advise defendants about
collateral consequences of pleas.5 '
Yet, Hill dealt solely with parole
eligibility,S' and the Supreme Court has not heard a case dealing specifically
with an alien's right to be advised about deportation consequences. 53 Thus,
Hill may discount a Due Process challenge based on involuntary and
unintelligent pleading, but it does not wholly discredit such an action.
To a great extent, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 safeguards the
intelligence and voluntariness of the plea.- Under Rule 11, the trial court has

47. In United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973), the alien defendant
unsuccessfully raised a challenge to the validity of his prior guilty plea under the Due Process clause
based on the lack of knowledge regarding the likelihood of deportation as a collateral consequence
of the plea. However, this case was heard prior to the amendment of 8 U.S.C § 1251(a) making
deportation mandatory under specific subsections. See supra note 3. Section 701 of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act may well have legislatively reversed the holding in Santelises by making
deportation mandatory. See Bendik & Cardoso, supra note 20, at 34.
48. 'An accused who has not received reasonably effective assistance from counsel in deciding
to plead guilty cannot be bound by his plea because a plea of guilty is valid only if made intelligently
and voluntarily." Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (1lth Cir. 1984).
49. In Houston v. Lack, 625 P. Supp. 785, 786-88 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), the court interpreted
the reasoning of Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). The court characterized Hill as a case where
"the voluntariness of a guilty plea was at issue in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel." Id. at 78. More directly, the court was deciphering Hill as an allegation of inadequate
counsel which, in rm, made the defendant's plea invalid. d. at 789.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
52. See generally Hill v. Lockard, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
53. Sarno, supra note 32, at 748-50.
54. In pertinent part, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads as follows:
(a) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere. Ifa defendant refuses
to plead... the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(b) Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands, the following:
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a duty to advise the defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea.' This
advisement is done by the court personally addressing the defendant in open
court and determining that the plea is based on facts known to the defendant.'
If a court fails to comply with the terms of Rule 11, a plea may be withdrawn
or a judgment may be vacated." Federal courts have generally not vacated
judgments or allowed aliens to withdraw guilty pleas under Rule 11 due to lack
of knowledge concerning deportation.s" Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that due process does not require Rule 11 admonishments. 5"
Many courts require aliens to show a direct consequence of the plea that
was not explained before a plea is invalidated because a lack of information
made that plea involuntary under due process or Rule I11.
Therefore, by
characterizing deportation as a collateral consequence, the federal courts have
taken the punch out of any resistance that aliens could have offered to
unforeseen deportation possibilities. For all practical purposes, once a plea is
entered, the defendant aliens incur a risk of deportation regardless of their

(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law, if any and the maximum possible penalty provided by law,
including the effect of any special parole or supervised release term .
; and
(2) the right to be represented by an attorney ... ; and
(3) the right to plead not guilty .... the right to be tried by a jury .... the right to
the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
the right against compelled self-incrimination; and
(4) that if a plea of guilty or noto contendere is accepted by the court there will not be
a fuirther trial of any kind...
(d) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is
voluntary.
(f) Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a
factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CitM. P. 11.
55. Id. at subsection (d).
56. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971).
57. See supra note 7.
58. "Defendant's first argument in support of his motion [for post conviction relief) is that his
plea was involuntary because the court failed to inform him of all the consequencesof his guilty plea
It is well settled that the trial judge is not required to inform a defendant of possible
immigration consequences pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement." United States v. Nagaro-Garbin,
653 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D.Mich. 1987). But see United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 41-42
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (court granted relief based on Rule 32(d)).
59. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 782 (1979), stands for the proposition that
failure to comply with Rule I1 is not a failure to comply with The Due Process Clause. See infra
note 92 and accompanying text.
60. Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948-49 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895
(1976); Sanchezv. United States, 572 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1977).
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This risk seems extremely unfair and suggests that some type of

modification in the present doctrine governing these actions is required.
C. The Collateral Versus Direct Dichotomy
The doctrine that controls the outcome of ineffective assistance challenges
and involuntary plea arguments- is the collateral consequence standard.'
Defining the terms "collateral" and "direct" is difficult, and as one court noted,
"[t]he distinction between a collateral and a direct consequence, like many of the
lines drawn in legal analysis, is obvious at the extremes and subtle at the
margin."' However, what is important for purposes of this Note is that the
federal courts have overwhelmingly held that deportation is collateral to criminal
convictions."
To begin, the test for making this distinction should first be explained. A
number of methods have been used to determine whether a particular
consequence is direct or collateral. 0 In United States v. Parrino, the Second
Circuit attempted to explain why deportation is collateral to a criminal

61. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
62. Maryellen Fullerton & Noah Kinigstein, Strategiesfor Ameliorating the Immigration
Consequencesof CriminalConvictions:A Guide ForDefenseAttonwys, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 425,
429 (1985-86), gives a brief overview of the collateral consequence doctrine and its effect on aliens'
attempts to invalidate guilty pleas. It reads as follows:
[Tihe courts generally view deportation as a "collateral* rather than "direct"
consequence of a guilty plea. Most courts are not affirmatively required to inform an
alien defendant that a guilty plea may result in deportation. If an alien defendant pleads
guilty to a crime without knowledge that such a plea could lead to deportation, the
resulting deportation will not invalidate the guilty plea. Relief from deportation
ordinarily will not be provided, even where an alien has clearly relied on the erroneous
advice of an attorney.
Id.
63. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982), demonstrates the imprecision
of the federal collateral consequence doctrine and the difficulty of applying it to aliens in this
situation. The court illustrates the ambiguity of the doctrine by referencing the division of
authorities on the subject. Id. In Russell, the court said that the collateral consequence doctrine is
difficult to apply because courts have merely defined the parameters of the doctrine by examining
its prior applications. Id.
64. United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989), summarized the positions of
a number of circuits regarding the classification of deportation as a collateral rather than direct
consequence. The court in George stated that, "[vlarious circuits have addressed the issue of failure
of counsel to inform an accused of the likely deportation consequences arising out of a guilty plea,
and have determined that deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal proceeding and
therefore no ineffective assistance of counsel was found." Id. In arriving at this sweeping
conclusion the court cited to the following decisions: United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gavilan,
761 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975).
65. See supra note 64 and infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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conviction in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea:6
Deportation here. . . was not the sentence of the court which
accepted the plea but of another agency [the INS] over which the trial
judge has no responsibility .... We do not think that the distinction
between a direct and collateral consequence depends upon the degree
of certainty with which the sanction will be visited upon the defendant
...[the trial judge] must assure himself only that the punishment that
"he" is meting out is understood ... ."
Utilizing the above stated analysis for the purpose of avoiding "manifest
injustice,"' the Second Circuit appeared to be determining whether a
consequence is collateral by asking the question: Did the lower court judge
impose a consequence that was unknown to the defendant? Yet, this method of
distinguishing between collateral and direct consequences is not followed
universally by all federal courts.'
In a later case, even the Second Circuit has seemingly used a different
approach to distinguish collateral consequences from direct consequences.'
Indeed, other circuits, such as the Fourth Circuit, have offered opinions that
flagrantly contradict the Second Circuit's analysis in Parrino. The Fourth
Circuit in Cuthrell v. Patuxent Institution stated that the distinction between
collateral and direct consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in relevant
decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and
largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.'
Generally, judicial interpretations of the terms "collateral" and "direct" have

66. Budeiri, Comment, supranote 17, at 171-73 rationalizes, '[Djespite criticism of the Second
Circuit's treatment of the case, Parrinohas not been reversed. Indeed, it has been referred to
frequently in cases in which the collateral consequences of guilty pleas were at issue."
67. United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
68. Under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the standard to vacate a
conviction and withdraw a guilty plea is a showing by the defendant of manifest injustice. Parrino,
212 F.2d at 921. Violation of Rule 32(d) was alleged by the defendant in Parrino,but the court
found no such violation. Id.
69. Compare supra note 67 with infra note 70.
70. United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1973), looks to whether the
consequence automatically resulted from the conviction rather than inquiring whether the lower court
judge imposed deportation as part of the sentence. But see Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461,
463 (2d Cir. 1974), where the Second Circuit again changed its position and held that only a
consequence imposed by the lower court as part of the sentence is a direct consequence.
71. This analysis by the Fourth Circuit in Cuthrell v. Patuxent Institute, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973), was explained in Budeiri, Comment, supra note 17.
Cuthrel involved civil commitment as a collateral consequence, but the analysis with which the court
determined that this consequence was collateral contrasts sharply with the rationale of Parrino.
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occasionally varied among the circuits and changed over time.'
In contrast to that of deportation, other examples of consequences resulting
from guilty pleas that have been held by the federal courts to be collateral and
insufficient to make the plea invalid include: separate civil proceedings against
the defendant for commitment to a mental health facility;' the possibility of
imposition of consecutive sentences;U the deprivation of the right to vote, hold
public office, and travel abroad; s and the possibility of dishonorable discharge

from the armed forces.

6

Still, such other consequences can easily be distinguished from deportation.
One who is civilly committed, for instance, is afforded periodic reevaluations
by medical personnel."
To distinguish another consequence, where
consecutive sentences are given for multiple convictions in a single trial, the
defendant has already been given separate explanations by the court regarding
the possible sentences for each count.'
Thus, defendants are given some
information about the consequences of pleading guilty in multiple conviction
cases, and the lack of awareness in such cases is clearly distinguished from
deportation scenarios. Finally, the right to vote, to hold public office, and to
travel abroad are merely "civic" rights" that are simply not as harsh as a life
sentence in exile.'
Also, in many cases deportation is a more direct and
automatic consequence than any other sanction."'
To evaluate the compelling need for change in the federal collateral
consequence doctrine, a brief survey of the repercussions held to be direct is
necessary. In one case, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant must be advised

72. Budeiri, Comment, supra note 17, at 169.
73. Ckuhre//, 475 F.2d at 1366.
74. United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1970).
75. Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (Sth Cir. 1963).
76. Redwine v. Zuchert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
77. Budeiri, Comment, supra note 17, at 176.
78. Villarreal v. United States, 508 F.2d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974), held that due to the
defendant's knowledge of the possibility for twenty-five year sentences on each count, he was
effectively on notice that he could receive fifty years altogether.
79. The Fifth Circuit denied withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea because certain individual
rights, such as voting and passport eligibility, were merely 'civic" in nature. Meaton v. United
States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964). The clear distinction between "civic" rights and other rights
was not explained, but the line of distinction seemed to hinge on the importance of such rights. Id.
80. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951), used this precise language to describe
deportation. See also Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (holding that deportation
is a penalty and a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile). Fong Yue
ling v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (acknowledging that "everyone knows that to be
forcibly taken away from your home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent
across the ocean to a distant land is punishment; and that oftentimes most severe and crel.*).
81. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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that time served in a state penitentiary prior to transfer to federal prison will not
be subtracted from a federal sentence.' Thus, time served in a state prison
before federal sentencing was found to be a direct factor relating to the decision
to plead guilty. In another case, the Second Circuit held that parole eligibility
is a direct consequence of a guilty plea because it has a definite effect on the
length of the defendant's prison term.' In these decisions, direct consequences
were found and the guilty pleas were vacated, but courts do not always allow
defendants to withdraw guilty pleas even where the defendant was ignorant of
a direct consequence."
Consequently, after considering the ambiguity of the terms "collateral" and
"direct", and the inconsistency of their uses, would not be completely fair or
ss
accurate to unequivocally declare deportation to be collateral to a guilty plea.
Deportation has been shown to be an automatic result of a guilty plea under 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) and the harshness of such a consequence is undisputed.
Under the current collateral consequence doctrine, aliens have clearly relied on
the erroneous advice of their attorneys, and yet the federal courts have denied
relief.' Thus, some type of change in the present system is required.

82. United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 403.04 (9th Cir. 1972). In Myers, the court found
that the defendant involuntarily pleaded guilty. Thus, the court granted relief to the defendant when
the consequence was held to be direct. Id.
83. In Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1970), the Second Circuit found parole
eligibility to be a direct consequence when it stated, "the unavailability of parole directly affects the
length of time an accused will have to serve in prison." But see Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d
266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899 (1967), Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1964) (demonstrating that there is a minority view holding
ineligibility for parole to be a collateral consequence).
84. Budeiri, Comment, supra note 17, at 194. "Although ineligibility for parole and mandatory
special parole terms are considered direct consequences in the majority view, courts do not always
allow defendants to withdraw guilty pleas, even ifthey prove that they were not advised of the direct
consequence." Id.
85. Budeiri summarizes the unfairness in this manner:
In sum, the rationales posited to justify the distinction between collateral and direct
consequencesare neitherpersuasive nor consistent. Ifa defendant suffers anunexpected
deprivation because of his guilty plea, his plea was not informed. The proper inquiry
is whether this lack of information is serious enough to violate due process, not what
label should be attached to the consequence.
Budeiri, Comment, supra note 17, at 194.
86. The United States Supreme Court has held that deportation may result in loss of all that
makes life worth living. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). See also supra note
So and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Parrino, 212
F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1954).
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I. AVOIDING THE INEQuTES AND WHY

A variety of avenues are available to insure that aliens are informed of the
likelihood of deportation when pleading guilty to any offense enumerated in
section 1251, but particularly subsection (a)(2)(B)." Each of the following
alternatives entails amelioration of the federal collateral consequence doctrine to
some extent. These particular solutions focus on insuring that aliens submit
voluntary and intelligent pleas and that their constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel is safeguarded. However, each proposed change could
have a distinct impact on other consequences of guilty pleas.
A. Deportation as a Direct Consequence
The classification of deportation as collateral has been sharply criticized by
numerous judicial opinions and other authorities. 9 As a result, many
authorities have contemplated the possibility of a Supreme Court decision
establishing deportation as a direct consequence of a guilty plea.' Such a
holding would obviously guarantee aliens the right to enter a voluntary and
intelligent guilty plea if the trial court's instruction on deportation effects of the
plea were consequently mandated under Rule 11 or the Due Process Clause.
Supreme Court precedent with this holding would also render ineffective
assistance of counsel challenges unnecessary by eliminating the need for a
formal advisement from defense counsel about the immigration effects of a
guilty plea.
However, the problem is that defendants are not even assured of the right
to be informed by the court of all direct consequences. 9' In other words, when
the trial court fails to advise the defendant of certain direct consequences, the
88. "The Immigration and Nationality Act, as implemented and made instructive by the Code
of Federal Regulations and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Operating Instructions, are
specific as to the laws, regulations and procedures pertaining to non-citizens who are convicted of
a crime." Roseman, Comment, supra note 2, at 160. See generallysupra note 2.
89. Parrino,212 F.2d at 921. See also infra notes 90 and 113.
90. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered a
challenge to a guilty plea in United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and despite
relying on prosecutorial misrepresentations in its reasoning, the court stated, 'Jilt is extremely
troublesome that deportation has never been considered a direct consequence of guilty pleas of the
sort that must be brought to the defendant's attention before his plea may be considered voluntary
under Rule 11."
Also, in a state court decision, People v. Luna, 570 N.E.2d 404 (III. App. Ct. 1991), the
Illinois Appellate Court, illustrated how finding deportation to be a direct consequence of a guilty
plea could be a functional solution to protect the rights of aliens. By determining deportation to be
a direct rather then collateral consequence, the need for applying the collateral consequence doctrine
is removed.
91. See supranote 84.
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error may be held harmless. Thus, it is unlikely that finding deportation to be
a direct consequence will adequately protect defendants' constitutional rights.
Many courts base their decisions regarding the alien's right to be advised
of deportation on the fact that deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea.'
The unfair conditions that aliens are exposed to in similar cases
involving aliens, could be removed by a Supreme Court decision holding
deportation to be a direct consequence of pleading guilty. Still, even for
consequences deemed direct, the common law, the Due Process Clause, and
Rule 11 guidelines for advisement are extremely vague." Therefore, other
alternatives for protecting aliens' constitutional rights may be more effective.
B. Consequences That Substantially and MateriallyAffect the Defendant's Life

Much of the contradiction and indefiniteness of the collateral consequence
doctrine exists because the federal courts are attempting to be fair in their
applications of the standard.' By creating an exception to the current federal
collateral consequence test for those consequences of guilty pleas that
substantially and materially affect defendants' lives, the Supreme Court would
sufficiently protect defendants' constitutional rights to enter knowing and
voluntary guilty pleas." By requiring trial courts to examine defendants'
92. United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703,704 (2d Cir. 1975); Michel v. United States, 507
F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1974). Accord United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir.
1970),for reh'g en banc denied, 454 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States v.
Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
93. In the context of a Rule I I challenge to the validity of a given plea, the Ninth Circuit
examined the right to make an informed and voluntary plea under McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Fnichtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d
946, 947 (9th Cir. 1976). As a result of Fruchtman, a defendant's right to advisement by the trial
court became even more uncertain:
[Alppellant draws the conclusion that the record of a plea, to be valid, must expressly
and unequivocally demonstrate that the defendant is informed of his constitutional rights
and waives them. . . . We have previously held that neither McCarthy nor Boyldn
requires that a defendant be advised of all of his constitutional rights by the trial court
if his plea is to be valid. Nor do we think that due process or Rule 11 impose such a
requirement.
Fruchrman, 531 F.2d at 947.
94. The court in United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), made this point
specifically when it explained, "It)he distribution ofjustice to alien defendants can only be enhanced
if the trial courts make sure such defendants know the pandects under which they plead."
95. The idea for a materiality based standard to evaluate consequences of guilty pleas was taken
from the Appellant's Brief at 12, People v. Huante, 550 N.E.2d 1155 (I1. App. Ct. 1990).
Attorney Stephen Connolly suggested that the court create a new standard but the court refused,
although the court did grant relief to the defendant in the case. Id. More specifically, Connolly
proposed that the Illinois courts adopt a bright line test focusing on the materiality of the
consequence rather than the old collateral/direct distinction in deciding whether an attorney should
be responsible for advising the defendant on such a consequence. Id.
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awareness of immigration consequences, the Supreme Court would eliminate the
need for courts to twist and strain the collateral consequence test in the interests
of justice. 96 Furthermore, this exception would eradicate the need for counsel
to advise the defendant of deportation consequences to effectively represent the
client.
The Court could implement this modification utilizing the original rationale
of the collateral consequence doctrine." The duty of trial courts to determine
if pleas are entered voluntarily by defendants and with a full understanding of
the law in relation to facts, as required by Due Process,' would merely be
clarified.
District courts would be required, as always, to make clear
determinations on the record that defendants were given fair notice of all direct
consequences of the guilty plea. Yet, consequences of the plea that substantially
and materially affect a person's life, like deportation, would also be explained.
Some federal courts have argued that imposing a duty on trial courts to
advise defendants of immigration consequences places an unmanageable burden
on trial judges." Yet, if such a requirement were mandated by the Supreme
Court, a mere statement by trial judges to defendants as follows would suffice
to insure aliens of their constitutional rights:
IF YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, A
GUILTY PLEA IN THIS COURT MAY CAUSE YOU TO BE
DEPORTED. DO YOU UNDERSTAND?

The feasibility of scrapping the collateral consequence doctrine altogether for a materiality
based standard will be evaluated in the next section of this Note.
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
97. In the case first elaborating on the collateral consequencedoctrine, Carafas v. Lavallee, 391
U.S. 234 (1969), the Court noted why the petitioner was entitled to relief. The Court stated:
ipletitioner is entitled to consideration of his application for relief on its merits. He is
suffering, and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities because of the law's
complexities and not because of his [own] fault, if his claim that he has been illegally
convicted is meritorious. There is no need in the statute, the Constitution, or sound
jurisprudence for denying to petitioner his ultimate day in court.
Id. at 239.
98. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938), characterizes the due process criteria
required of trial courts to insure the validity of guilty pleas. The Court stated, "if a defendant's
guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process
and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a
formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding
of the law in relation to the facts." Id.
99. United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1982), offers such an opinion. In Garrett,
the court declared, "[tihe fact that the deportation proceeding was one over which the trial judge had
no control and no responsibility was important to the analysis of whether it was a direct or a
collateral consequence. We decline to impose on the trial judge what would become an
unmanageable burden of advising the defendant of such a consequence." Id. at 66.
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This seems like a small price to pay for protecting the constitutional rights
of individuals in this country. Yet even ajudicial admonishment is unnecessary
if the alien has, in some manner, demonstrated to the judge that he is aware of
the likelihood of deportation. Thus, if the trial judge determines, either at trial
through testimony of the alien himself, or at a hearing on a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea through evidence such as the defense attorney's testimony, that
the alien knows the deportation consequences of pleading guilty, then no relief
would be granted. This finding must be achieved for the record to avoid further
complication. Where the judge decides that the alien is aware of the deportation
consequences, the judge would merely have to state aloud before entering
judgment as follows:
I FIND THE DEFENDANT AWARE OF THE DEPORTATION
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.
To give trial courts a measuring stick in deciding which consequences are
so "substantial" that they qualify for such judicial cognizance, the Supreme
Court has already provided some direction. As early as 1922, the Court
characterized deportation as a "loss of all... that makes life worth living."" °
Where a consequence of a guilty plea will permanently and irreparably alter a
person's life as deportation does, defendants should at least be told of the
consequence before they decide to plead guilty.
The "materiality" requirement for judging the applicability of the standard
to a particular consequence also has previously established foundations in the
common law. Courts frequently deal with the materiality of facts in actions
involving motions to reopen deportation proceedings."I
One court
characterized the Supreme Court's interpretation of this requirement in the
context of a motion to reopen deportation proceedings as "evidence tending to

100. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
101. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1991) reads:
The Board [of Immigration Appeals) may on its own motion reopen or reconsider any
case in which it has rendered a decision. Reopening or reconsideration of any case in
which a decision has been made by the Board, whether requested by the Commissioner
[of the Immigration and Naturalization Servicel or any other duly authorized officer of
the Service, or by the party affected by the decision, shall be only upon written motion
to the Board. Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless
it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is "material" and was not
available and could not have been made discovered or presented at the former hearing;
nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to
apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted if it appears that the alien's right
to apply for such relief was fully explained to him ...at the former hearing unless the
relief is sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen subsequent to the
hearing.
For application of this standard by a judicial forum, see infra note 102.
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Furthermore, at least one state

court has seemingly utilized a materiality standard to rate the importance of
court advisement about deportation consequences." °3 Thus, this element would
be relatively easy to implement in conjunction with the federal collateral
consequence doctrine.
A trial court determination that the defendant had notice of the deportation
consequences is a finding of fact. Therefore, a highly deferential degree of
scrutiny would be afforded to the federal district courts on this issue.'
A
district court determination that an alien knew the deportation consequences of
pleading guilty would only be overturned on appeal if the finding was clearly
erroneous.i5
Looking to Congressional intent, the United States Congress has expressly
provided that deportation must be withheld under § 8 U.S.C. 1253(h) where the
alien's life or freedom would be threatened by deportation.'t 6 This section
implies a congressional desire to protect the interests of deportable aliens facing
deportation. In fact, a House Report on the legislative history of section 1253(h)
explains that deportation should be prohibited to avoid severe economic
disadvantage and deprivation of liberty, as well as physical harm."°e
Consequently, modification of the collateral consequence doctrine to protect

aliens' interests flows smoothly with the currents of congressional design.

102. Zacarias v. United States, 921 F.2d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 1990), examined the Supreme
Court's opinion in INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988), to define the term material in relation to a
motion to reopen a deportation proceeding against an alien.
103. In People v. Huante, 550 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (111.App. Ct. 1990), the court said, "(in
view of these factors, our courts have concluded that the potential deportation consequencesofguilty
pleas in criminal proceedings brought against alien defendants are material to critical phases of such
proceedings.*
104. The appellate court standard for reviewing the lower court's findings of fact and states that
such findings will be overturned only upon a showing that such findings are clearly erroneous.
United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
105. Id.
106. The pertinent language of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1992) is as follows:
(h)(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien
described in 8 USC § 125 l(a)(4)(D)to a country if the Attorney General determines that
such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
107. "The harm or suffering need not be physical, but may take other forms, such as the
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing,
employment, or other essentials of life." AMENDING THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,
H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
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C.
Discarding the Collateral Consequence Doctrine Completely for a
MaterialityBased Standard
One possible solution that would guarantee defendants' awareness of all
consequences that might be pivotal in their decisions to plead guilty, thus
insuring voluntariness, would be to replace the collateral consequence test with
a materiality standard."U Yet, problems arise with completely discarding the
current federal consequence test. As developed by the common law, the
collateral/direct dichotomy provides the federal courts with a uniform initial
inquiry. The doctrine provides a screening mechanism for insuring defendants'

awareness of the significant effects of their guilty pleas,'" and without such
a device district courts would be extremely burdened. Judicial efficiency would
also be jeopardized as many courts feared,"' and the number of defendants
alleging invalidity of their guilty pleas for failure to be informed of all
"material" consequences would be unmanageable. To avoid such problems,
courts should first evaluate the consequences under the collateral consequence
doctrine, and then ask whether there may be other substantial and material
consequences of which the defendant should be given notice.
Another foreseeable problem in converting from the collateral/direct test
to a materiality standard is that courts would be treading in new frontiers. With

absolutely no guidance from prior decisions, courts will be forced to select
108. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
109. In Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982), Justice Stevens elaborated on the Court's
doctrine of collateral consequences in the context of an action for relief from mandatory parole terms
where the petitioners were not advised of such consequences when they plead guilty. The Court
held the case moot because petitioners' parole terms had expired by the time the case was heard.
d. at 633-34. Thus, the Court did not grant the relief requested, but the decision provided two
important reasons:
First, the petitioners did not seek to withdraw their pleas and subject themselves to further
penalties. Rather, petitioners merely sought to have the parole terms removed. Therefore, the
petitioners themselves chose not to preserve the live controversy. d. at 630-31. Second, the Court
limited the situations where the collateral consequence doctrine should be invoked. Justice Stevens
distinguished between statutory consequences and non-statutory consequences, and implied that
statutory consequences would be more likely to invoke the constitutional protections of due process.
Id.
Applying the same rationale to a motion to vacate a guilty plea because of lack of advice
regarding deportation, it seems the court would vacate the plea. By their actions, all defendants
wishing to withdraw their guilty pleas to avoid deportation are subjecting themselves to fresh
convictions and sentences if found guilty. Also, deportation is a statutory consequence of a criminal
conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1251. Thus, the rationale of the Supreme Court in Lane is consistent
with the ideas in this Note, and seems to reiterate that the purpose of the collateral consequence
doctrine is to insure defendants' awareness of significant consequences of their pleas.
See also infra note 113 for explanation of the collateral consequence doctrine with respect to Rule
I1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
110. See supra notes 32 and 99, and infra note 113.
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consequences thought to be "material" in order to advise defendants and insure
due process of law. Federal court precedent already provides trial courts with
a list of consequences deemed collateral and a list determined to be direct.",
Thus, replacing the federal collateral consequence doctrine completely with a
materiality based standard would likely open up a Pandora's box of
complications.
D. ProposedAmendment to Rule 11 of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure
As explained earlier, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
is designed to insure intelligence and voluntariness of defendants when pleading
guilty." 2 Arguing that defendants cannot knowingly plead guilty without
information about immigration ramifications, Judge Mikva contemplated the
necessity of an amendment to Rule 11 in his United States v. Del Rosario
concurrence."13 Judge Mikva concluded that where a trial judge has reason
to believe a defendant is an alien, the judge should be required to make the
defendant aware of the major consequence of deportation.' 4
However, the requirements of Rule 11 are not constitutionally mandated,
and formal violations of the Rule do not provide grounds for invalidating a
guilty plea.'
Rule 11 admonishments are viewed only as instruments that
help to protect defendants' due process rights." 6 In some cases, due process

111. See supranotes 62-82 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 7, 54 and accompanying text.
113. Judge Mikva, concurring in United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir.
1990) stated:
Because deportation is in a category so obviously distinct from other collateral
consequencesenumerated by the majority, I have sore difficulty crediting the fiction that
the defendant has knowingly pled when he is not provided meaningful information about
the relevant deportation consequences of his plea.
I would hope that the Rules Committee of the Judicial Conference would consider
amending Rule 11 of the [Federal] Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a judge
taking a guilty plea to inform an alien that pleading guilty might result in deportation at least when the judge is made aware of the defendant's alien status before accepting
his plea. I do not seek to frustrate the undeniable benefits of resolving prosecutions
through a streamlined and efficient Rule 11 proceeding. Yet, the validity of such
proceedings is unequivocally premised upon the defendant's knowing the most
significant consequences of his plea. Rule 11 requires that a defendant be told the
punishment allowed under the guilty plea; it should similarly require that such a major
consequence as deportation also be put in the praecognita.
Id.
114. Id.
115. See generally United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1989); Poerio v. United
States, 405 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (explaining that literal violations of Rule 11 may result
in non-reversible harmless error).
116. Montoya, 891 F.2d at 1292.
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of law has been found to be satisfied despite the failure of trial couit adherence
to Rule 11 directives."" Adequate adherence to Rule 11 guidelines is not
guaranteed."'
Because failure to advise defendants may be considered
harmless error, the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea is not insured by
Rule 11 criteria alone. ' '9
Furthermore, viable claims of ineffective assistance and involuntary guilty
pleas have constitutional depth." ' To resolve these claims, the Supreme Court
must act. An amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will not
alleviate the constitutional questions. Even if such an amendment is passed,
failure to advise aliens of deportation under the proposed rule could still be
deemed harmless error.
Consequently, amending Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to include trial court advice about deportation would only guarantee
that pleas are voluntary and intelligent if the Supreme Court were to recognize
that this admonishment is constitutionally mandated. With Supreme Court
recognition, the constitutional rights of aliens would be insured, and the lower
federal courts would have a clear standard to meet in advising defendants about
deportation consequences. Without constitutional protection, Rule 11 could be
discarded at any future time, and failure to provide the defendant with adequate
information could be considered harmless error.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Under the current federal collateral consequence doctrine, alien defendants
are particularly subject to unfair conditions and loss of constitutional rights. A
number of options are open to the United States Supreme Court to remove these
hardships, but obstacles exist to implementing each of these proposals. An
amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would
eradicate the need for a radical change in the collateral consequence doctrine.
This solution is potentially the best one. However, the commands of Rule 11
are not constitutionally required, and without further direction from the Supreme
Court, defendants may still be deprived of constitutional rights. Furthermore,
completely replacing the collateral consequence doctrine with a materiality

117. Id.
118. Comment, Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeal 1989-1990, 79 GEO. LJ. 591, 892-94 (1991), explains that Rule 11
admonishments are not constitutionally mandated. Furthermore, the author explains that a violation
of Rule II may amount to harmless error. Id. at 898. See also United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d
1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Stead, 746 F.2d 355, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1984).
119. See generally United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1989).
120. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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standard would create extreme burdens on trial court judges and raise judicial
efficiency concerns.
Consequently, adding a tangent to the collateral
consequence test by requiring trial courts to advise defendants of all substantial
and material consequences would best insure defendants' rights to plead
intelligently and voluntarily. This addition would eliminate the need to invalidate
guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
ScoTr A. KozLov
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